The emptiness of the emptiness of emptiness

The argument in part a is based only on the early Buddhist and Theravada view of enlightenment. Mahayana Buddhists are likely to complain that Buddhism has already long since seen through all these problems with the metaphysics of Reality, and adapted accordingly. Some points that relate to the mainstream Mahayana will be discussed in this section, and the different approach of Zen Buddhism in section c.

There have been lengthy metaphysical disputes about Reality within the Buddhist tradition, for example between the Sarvastivada school which believed in ultimately real phenomenal entities, and the Madhyamaka school which denied that there were any real entities. However, these opposed schools were only arguing about how the process of delusion should be explained – is it that we put together things that are actually there wrongly, or is it that there is nothing there in the first place? The central idealist belief – that when we look at something in front of us (say, a tree) what we think is there is not really there – remains.

The Madhyamaka school (led by Nagarjuna) also put forward a critical metaphysics, a development of the Middle Way, to show how our experiences are neither true nor false. Potentially this is neither idealist nor realist, but asserts that Reality is beyond all description. This philosophical perspective is linked to the practices and texts of the Perfection of Wisdom, where this critique of metaphysics even becomes the basis of a meditation practice, the contemplation of emptiness. “Emptiness” basically means the constructedness and ultimate unreality of all the concepts we use, and naturally this extends also to the concept of Emptiness itself. The contemplation of emptiness culminates in the emptiness of emptiness.

The Madhyamaka critique of metaphysics seems to confirm a lot of the points I was making in the previous section – except that Buddhists rarely see it that way. Instead of giving up the concepts of enlightenment and Reality, the inspiration of the Madhyamaka seems to lead Buddhists only to reinforce them by finding increasingly subtle accounts of them. The Madhyamaka functions as a spoiler for radical criticism of Buddhism rather than as an inspiration for reform.

One of the ways that the Madhyamaka is made compatible with other Buddhist conceptual language is through a rigid distinction between ultimate metaphysical language and conventional language. Thus Buddhists will happily recite texts from the Perfection of Wisdom such as the Heart Sutra, which acknowledges that nirvana is a construction with no relationship to Reality, in the same ritual in which they express their aspiration for nirvana and appeal for the support of beings that have attained it. When questioned about this, they are likely to say that conventionally there is nirvana, even if ultimately there is no nirvana. We have no choice, short of nirvana, other than to express ourselves in conventional language.

This means that the effect of the (purely theoretical) acknowledgement of the Madhyamaka critique of metaphysics is to put all conventional language on the same level of acceptability. Instead of applying the Madhyamaka critique in order to throw themselves back on experience, and use experience as the basis of judgement, Buddhists habitually keep the Madhyamaka critique in a conceptual isolation where it can have no effect on the rest of their thinking. The emptiness of emptiness is not just empty because a further level of theoretical criticism can be applied to it, but also because it is completely abstracted and apparently has no further effect on those who contemplate it.

It may be objected that Mahayana Buddhists simply do not agree with my interpretation of the implications they ought to draw from Emptiness. The practical implication, they may say, is not to abandon conventional Buddhist beliefs, but just to hold them a little more lightly, with more provisionality. However, it is not possible to hold a metaphysical view provisionally. Provisionality requires the possibility of change when new experiences come along, but the belief in Reality is not based on experience, but only on faith reinforced by tradition that there is such a Reality.

The Perfection of Wisdom, and the Madhyamaka critique of metaphysics, is possibly the biggest philosophical spoiler in history. You may object to Plato’s crypto-Fascist state, or Jesus’ belief in the Last Judgement, or Confucius’ patriarchal conservatism – but at least with these thinkers you know what they stand for, and they do not pretend to also believe the opposite. In Mahayana Buddhism you may think you agree, or at least find a fruitful acceptance of mystery; but you do not really know what it stands for, or what else you may be unwittingly asked to swallow with your emptiness.

Continue to Chapter 6 part c 'Reality is here and now'