moralobjectivity.net: copyright Robert M. Ellis 2011

Common but unhelpful assumptions 3: The identification of objectivity with absolute claims

In common speech we tend to use the terms 'objective' and 'subjective' in two kinds of incompatible ways. On the one hand we we use the terms in a way compatible with our experience: for example we talk about the need to 'be objective' about a particular issue where there is a passionate dispute. In these sorts of cases we are talking about ways that people can change and develop their viewpoint so as to take more conditions into account and be less limited by particular assumptions. We are talking incrementally, not absolutely.

On the other hand, in philosophy and science an absolute concept of objectivity still lingers - and indeed, plays a pivotal role. An absolute concept of objectivity is one in which all facts are known completely, and there is no distortion from 'subjective' elements arising from people's partial views and feelings. Although it is usually acknowledged that we do not in practice have this 'God's-eye-view', this absolute objectivity is still the basis of reasoning about the knowledge, meaning and values. For example the truth-conditional theory of meaning that dominates analytic philosophy is dependent upon a complete abstraction - the idea of the circumstances in which a given proposition would be true, regardless of whether or not we do or could experience such circumstances - in order to give an account of meaning. Theories of knowledge depend on an idea of abstract 'truth', even when we do not experience any justification for believing that we have such a truth. Utilitarian and Kantian theories of ethics also depend on an absolute perspective from which a given action would be right or wrong, regardless of how far we can or should grasp its rightness or wrongness.

These absolute conceptions of objectivity have much more practical effect than is often acknowledged. For example, people get mired in irrational guilt because they believe that in some absolute sense they "should not" have done something that in practice was easily justifiable, or utilitarian calculation gives a false confidence to politicians or bureaucrats who think they have covered every angle, but forget the basic factor of their own ignorance in deciding to fight wars, build mega-dams or manipulate genes. If we always thought of objectivity in incremental terms we would not make the practical mistake either of assuming we have total justification or no justification.

So it is philosophers (and to some extent scientists, and perhaps some other academic thinkers) who need to change their conception of objectivity to one that is actually in accordance with our experience - but for practical reasons. Some philosophers (such as Thomas Nagel) have explained objectivity in this way. However, we also need to see the negative effects of using it absolutely in maintaining metaphysical habits of thought (see assumption no. 2). Adjusting our use of 'objectivity' in this way is not revolutionary, but just means developing one aspect of our thinking rather than another.

This is not merely an appeal to 'ordinary language' either, because once we start using 'objectivity' in an incremental sense, and unite this with a questioning of some of the other assumptions discussed in this section of the web, site (listed in the margin), we have the tools to resolve long-standing philosophical problems with associated practical applications. Most important of these is the fact-value distinction (no. 6), which has a close relationship to absolute ideas of objectivity ("facts" are seen as "objective", "values" as "subjective"). With incremental objectivity comes the possibility of justifying our beliefs, whether about facts or values, without having to appeal to dogmatic metaphysical claims about the way the universe is supposed to be or the way it is supposed to be run. Discussing objectivity in incremental terms is the key to avoiding absolutism and relativism.

 

Links to related pages on this website:

Objectivity (concept page)

Moral objectivity (concept page)

The characteristics of eternalism (thesis)

The characteristics of nihilism (thesis)

 

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Seven common but unhelpful assumptions in Western thought:

1. The negative implications of scepticism

2. The need to accept or reject metaphysical claims

3. The identification of objectivity with absolute claims

4. The acceptability of pure analysis not applied to concrete contexts

5. An account of meaning confined to representation or expression

6. The fact-value distinction

7. The identification of ego with self

Concepts index

Discussion forum

Return to home page

 

Seven common but unhelpful assumptions in Western thought:

1. The negative implications of scepticism

2. The need to accept or reject metaphysical claims

3. The identification of objectivity with absolute claims

4. The acceptability of pure analysis not applied to concrete contexts

5. An account of meaning confined to representation or expression

6. The fact-value distinction

7. The identification of ego with self

Concepts index

Discussion forum

Return to home page

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